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RECENT DECISION
RENO V. ACLU: THE COMMUNICATIONS
DECENCY ACT HITS A RED LIGHT ON THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
John M. Beahn'
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."' The
simplistic brevity of the First Amendment inherently remains misleading.
Although the language of the First Amendment appears absolute, the
Supreme Court never has held the First Amendment to confer an absolute right to free speech. Rather, the Court has excluded certain categories of speech from any constitutional protection based solely on their
content.3 These types of speech, such as violence-advocating or obscene
speech, remain unprotected because they have no redeeming value and
lack any beneficial content.4
The Court also has approved restrictions on certain types of speech not
based on their content, but rather on their method of delivery Such
situations arise when the courts permit restrictions on certain speech,
such as indecent speech, based solely on the medium through which that
speech is communicated.' From the printed media, to the telephonic
+ J.D. candidate, May 1998, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend I.
2. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (discussing
the various types of unprotected speech); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618-19
(1919) (denying protection to pamphlets opposing intervention in Russia); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.").
3. See e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (excluding from constitutional protection speech that incited or produced imminent lawless action); Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 571-72 (noting the various forms of unprotected speech); Schenck, 249 U.S. at
52 (noting that some speech does not receive constitutional protection).
4. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. The Court stated that "[t]here are certain ... classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem." Id.
5. See E. Walter Van Valkenburg, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 75 OR. L.
REV. 319, 319 (1996).
6. See Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v.
FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 876 (9th Cir. 1991). The court wrote that "in any first amendment
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media, to the broadcast media, the Supreme Court has struggled to distinguish permissible from impermissible speech since "each medium of
expression presents special First Amendment problems."7 A comprehensive analysis of today's First Amendment problems, therefore, includes both a content-based analysis and a medium-specific analysis."
The current wave of technological advancement in communications
presents the same First Amendment problems that the legislatures and
courts have wrestled with for many years.9 This exploding area of communications once again has forced the
legislatures and courts to revisit
1
"the intractable obscenity problem."
The most recent Congressional attempt to control the availability of
certain types of speech in a communications medium was the adoption of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)," a part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.12 The incredible explosion in the popularity of the Internet, 3 the so-called "Information Superhighway," 14 and the
speech case, [we must] evaluate both the content of words and the context in which they
are delivered." Id.
7. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
8. See G. Sidney Buchanan, Toward A Unified Theory Of GovernmentalPower To
Regulate ProtectedSpeech, 18 CONN. L. REV. 531, 535 (1986). Buchanan asserts that the

Supreme Court looks to two dominant variables in its analysis of First Amendment issues:
"the content variable,.., and the forum [mode] variable." Id.
9. Cf. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 n.4, 2336-39 (1997) (discussing the availability of sexually explicit material on the Internet and the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 (CDA)). The historic inter-relationships that have existed between pornography,
counterculturalism, and new communications media should be noted. See DANIEL
BURSTEIN & DAVID KLINE, ROAD WARRIORS: DREAMS AND NIGHTMARES ALONG
THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY 106-07 (1995). Pornographic pictures prompted the devel-

opment of photography and film development in the late nineteenth century. See id. at
107. X-rated movies drove the development and wide-spread usage of VCRs in the home.
See id. Today's new technology apparently has followed in the footsteps of its media forefathers because, as of June 1995, three of the top 20 Internet sites were dedicated to sex.
See id.
10. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. .15, 16 (1973) (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
11. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502(2)(d), 110 Stat. 133, 133-36 (1996) (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 223 (a) to (h)).
12. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56(1996).
13. The term "Internet" resulted from a combination of the words "interconnection"
and "network," and refers to "'the network formed by the cooperative interconnection of
computing networks."' GLEE HARRAH CADY & PAT MCGREGOR, MASTERING THE
INTERNET 5 (2d ed. 1996).
14. This term was popularized by then-Senator Al Gore, Jr., who for years campaigned for the construction of a National Research and Education Network. See BILL
GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 5 (1995). This origin seemed appropriate because Al Gore,
Sr., another long time Tennessee Senator, had been responsible for the legislation that led
to the development of a national highway system in the 1960s. See id. Another term often
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resultant increase in pornography available on the Internet, prompted
the inclusion of the CDA in the Telecommunications Bill. 5 The CDA
outlawed a variety of indecent and obscene communications previously
available on the Internet, and criminalized the transmission of obscene
or indecent communications to any person under the age of eighteen by
16
means of a telecommunications device.
The adoption of the CDA greatly incensed Internet users, who staged
a world wide blackout of the Internet during which thousands of Internet
web sites shut down in protest)7 Immediately following President
Clinton's signature of the CDA, two lawsuits were filed challenging the
Act's constitutionality." The first suit, filed in the Eastern District of
used to describe the Internet, "cyberspace," was initially coined by William Gibson in his
See HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL
science-fiction novel NEUROMANCER.
COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 5 (1993). Gibson wrote

that cyberspace involved "[a] consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts... A
graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human
system." GIBSON, supra note 1, at 51. The term "cyber" is derived from the term "cybernetics," initially used to describe the science of computers. See CADY & MCGREGOR, supra note 14, at 835.
15. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 n.24 (1997).
16. See § 502(2)(d), 110 Stat. at 133-34.
17. See Jim Upchurch, The dark dawn of the "Decency Act" (published Feb. 12,1996)
These sites went
<http://www.mont.mindspring.coml-jtu3/arts/96.02.12decent.html>.
black for 48 hours. See id.
18. See Shea ex. rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
affd, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117
S. Ct. 2329 (1997). Both suits specifically challenged 47 U.S.C. §'223(d)(1), which provided:
Whoever(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image,
or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the
call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunication facility under such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it
be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
The plaintiffs also challenged 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), which provided:
Whoever(1) in interstate or foreign communications(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
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Pennsylvania by a coalition of plaintiffs led by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), argued that the CDA unconstitutionally infringed
on First Amendment free speech rights. 9 The second lawsuit filed by the
publisher of an on-line newspaper challenged the CDA on substantially
similar grounds. 20
Both cases were brought under a provision of the CDA allowing for an
expedited constitutional challenge to the statute before a district court
three-judge panel." Both panels overturned the CDA as an unconstitutional infringement on free speech 2 2 and focused their opinions on the
plaintiffs' two main arguments: statutory vagueness and overbreadth.23
While the panels disagreed on whether the CDA was unconstitutionally
vague,24 both found that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it would result in an impermissible chill on the free speech rights of
some Internet users.25
Although both sets of plaintiffs had similar interests in wanting to dismantle the CDA, dissimilar motives drove their involvement. Dedicated
Internet users, obsessed with governmental intrusion into their lives 21z
view the Internet as the final frontier in which government regulation
and intrusion is not only unwelcome, but also repulsive to the very principles that make the Internet so appealing: its decentralized
structure, its
27
anonymity.
liberating
its
and
autonomy,
self-regulated
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the
maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication;
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id. § 223(a)(1)(B).
19. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827. This suit was filed the same day that the CDA
was signed into law. See id.
20. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 923-24. This suit was filed the same day the CDA went
into effect. See id.
21. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561(a)-(b), 110 Stat. 133, 142-43 (1996).
22. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 950; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849.
23. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 935; cf. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849.
24. Compare Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 936 (finding the definition of indecency not unconstitutionally vague), with ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858 (finding the definitions of "indecent"
and "patently offensive" to be unconstitutionally vague).
25. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 950; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854 (Sloviter, C.J., supporting opinion).
26. Cf RHEINGOLD, supra note 15, at 253-57 (discussing the sharp reaction by early
Internet users to Operation Sun Devil, the FBI's crackdown on computer "hackers").
27. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 107 (noting the lack of a controlling
hierarchy on the Internet as its principal appeal); cf. GATES, supra note 15, at 92 (noting
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The coalition led by the ACLU, more concerned with the constitutional ramifications of the CDA, viewed the statute as a veiled attempt
by Congress to blur the judicially created distinctions between protected
and unprotected speech. 8 The ACLU's arguments focused primarily on
the disparate constitutional protection afforded to information on the
Internet under the CDA as opposed to other media of expression. 29
They viewed this disparity as a dangerous first step toward everincreasing infringement on the constitutional right to free speech. °
On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court updated the First Amendment
for the twenty-first century. The Court accomplished this in Reno v.
312
ACLU," which struck down the Communications Decency Act (CDA).32
The Court found the CDA overbroad in comparison to previous Courtapproved laws that prohibited indecent communication." In its opinion,
the Court dismissed the government's reliance on previous Courtapproved speech restrictions as misplaced, and found the statute insufficiently tailored to effectuate the government's interest in preventing minors' exposure to indecent material.34 The concurrence found the CDA
to be a mere attempt to create unconstitutional "adult zones" on the
Internet.35 The concurrence conceded that such "adult zones" could be
constitutional, but found that the CDA failed to adhere to proper drafting procedures in creating these zones.36
This Recent Decision first describes the technological structure and
inherent strengths of the Internet. It then provides an in-depth analysis
of the development of First Amendment theory, focusing first on content-based restrictions and then on medium-based restrictions. This Rethat text-only exchanges on the Internet have fostered a "social, racial, gender, and species
blind" net culture).
28. Cf. Barry Steinhardt, CirculatingDraft of Revisions to the Exon Amendment (visited Oct. 29, 1996) <gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/0/vtw/exon/analyses/aclu3> (noting that
the CDA attempted to impose restrictions permissible in some media on the Internet
without appropriate justification).
29. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) About the 1995 Communications Decency
Act (last modified June 27, 1995) <http://www.panix.com/vtw/exon/index.html> (presenting alleged myths related to the CDA, and distinguishing the Internet from other FCC
regulatable media).
30. See id. (presenting a web page section entitled "Brief Analysis" of CDA).
31. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
32. See id. at 2334 (holding that the CDA's statutory language abridges the First
Amendment's free speech protections).
33. See id. at 2351.
34. See id.
35. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
36. See id. (asserting that the proper drafting procedures for such "zoning" can be
found in the Court's "prior cases").
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cent Decision critically analyzes the two district court challenges to the
CDA and provides an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Reno
v. ACLU. This Recent Decision contends that the Supreme Court
greatly narrowed the constitutional chances of any future attempts at restricting indecent speech and concludes that any attempt to regulate the
Internet, though legally permissible, remains technically unfeasible.
I. THE INTERNET-INHERENT STRENGTHS LEAD TO ENFORCEMENT
WEAKNESSES

The Department of Defense initially developed the Internet to act as a
reliable, high-speed method of communication that would allow governmental agencies to access supercomputers and to communicate with one
another in the event of a nuclear disaster.37 The rapid increase in demand for Internet access, coupled with the development of faster, more
powerful computer networks, caused the Internet to become more decentralized and less dependent on a small number of government-run
supercomputers, and more reliant on individual local networks. 8 These
local networks underscore the current decentralized nature of the Internet.
Because the Internet relies on numerous local computer networks for
its operation, no one organization governs or manages it.39 Instead, the
Internet remains a vast, loosely organized alliance of individual, cooperating computer networks that are self-operated and self-financed. 40 Thus,
the Internet utilizes a series of decreasingly smaller networks, layered on
37. See PAUL GILSTER, THE INTERNET NAVIGATOR 16 (2d ed. 1994). In the late
1960s, the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense
(ARPA) designed and developed ARPANET, the forerunner of the modern day Internet.
See id. The primary missions of this new computer network were to aid researchers with
the exchange of information and to study how communications between government
bodies could be maintained in the event of a nuclear attack. See id.
38. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 15, at 79-83 (describing the privatization and rate of
growth of Internet use).
39. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 107. Several organizations, however,
guide and assist in the growth of the Internet. See CADY & MCGREGOR, supra note 14, at
27-28, 819, 821. These organizations, such as the Internet Society and the Internet Architecture Board (lAB), handle much of the architectural work of the Internet. See id. at 819,
821. Another group responsible for "governing" the Internet is the Network Information
Center (NIC), sponsored by the National Science Foundation. See id. at 11. The NIC
registers the names and addresses of new computers being added to the Internet. See id.
Despite the involvement of these groups in the management of the Internet, some commentators have maintained that the structure of the Internet renders it "ungovernable."
See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 113.
40. See CADY & MCGREGOR, supra note 14, at 7-11 (depicting the Internet as a
"network of networks," that remains void of ownership).
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top of one another, that communicate over high speed data circuits.41
When a user-sends a message across the Internet, the message does not
remain a single continuous unit. Rather, the Transmission Control Pro42
tocol (TCP) breaks up the message into small "packets" of information.
The Internet Protocol (IP) prepares these packets for mailing, ensuring
that the packets will reach the proper destination by enclosing each
packet into a separate "envelope" containing the proper address. 43 These
packets are sent independently over various Internet routes to their
proper destination. "4 Upon arrival at the final destination, TCP reassembles the packets into their original form.45
The technological structure and inherent strengths of the Internet enable users to access information easily, including pornography. 4' This
same structure and strength also creates tremendous enforcement problems associated with any attempt to limit the information available on
the Internet. Presently, no governing body manages the Internet4 7 and,
because there is no central bottleneck that information must pass
through, it would be difficult for any governing body to restrict the availability of certain information.48 Other factors that create enforcement
problems include inexpensive entry to the Internet and anonymous ex-

41. See GILSTER, supra note 38, at 16-17.
42. See CADY & MCGREGOR, supra note 14, at 13 ("Packets are one of the basic
units of measurement on the Internet.").
43. See id.
44. See id. at 13-14. As the packets travel through the Internet, "routers" examine
the addresses of each IP envelope and determine the most efficient path of transport. See
id. A router is a special computer that forwards and directs traffic between different networks. See id. at 837. Routers determine the best path for the packet to take to its final
destination based on its IP address. See id. at 13-14.
45. See id. at 14. The entire process of packet transfer remains possible because the
Internet is a packet-switched network. See GILSTER, supra note 38, at 18. In a packetswitched network, information packets from the same message travel across a variety of
data circuits to reach the same final destination. See id. A natural advantage of a packetswitched network is that it allows the routers to determine alternate routes for transmissions if a particular link fails or remains unavailable. See id. It should be noted that the
development of packet-switched networks resulted from a desire to eliminate any central
link for the exchange of information between military centers because such a link would
constitute an easy target during a nuclear attack. Cf. id.
46. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334-36 (1997) (discussing the capabilities of
the Internet and the availability of pornography on-line); see also BURSTEIN & KLINE,
supra note 10, at 106-07 (noting the wide variety of information people access on the
Internet).
47. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 106-07.
48. Cf. id. (describing the Internet as "an off-road environment" without "stoplights
or traffic dividers").
49. See id. at 116; GATES, supranote 15, at 97.
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istence on the Internet for users as well as operators of Internet sites,
which can frustrate attempts to regulate unwanted activity.0 Thus, any
attempt to enforce statutory restrictions on the Internet, such as the
CDA, would encounter numerous technical roadblocks.
II. RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT, INCESSANT LEGAL
CATCH-UP

A. The Exclusion of Obscenity from ConstitutionalProtection
It is a long-established judicial fact that obscene speech can be prohibited by the government.' Although federal courts addressed limited obscenity issues in the late nineteenth century,52 and the Supreme Court explicitly had approved the government's ability to restrict certain types of
speech,53 the Court did not address squarely the issue of governmental
restriction of obscene speech until the mid-twentieth century.
The Supreme Court first considered the question of the level of constitutional protection afforded obscene speech in Roth v. United States.5 4 In
Roth, the Court upheld the convictions of several defendants who had
published and sold sexually explicit materials in violation of federal and
state obscenity statutes. 55 After a review of its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court concluded that obscenity always had been outside
the bounds of constitutional protection.56 Although, historically, obscenity had not been excluded specifically from constitutional protection, the
Court reasoned that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is
the rejection of obscenity as [being] utterly without redeeming social im-

50. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 107; GATES, supra note 15, at 162.
51. See Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle. 91, 101-03 (Pa. 1815) (convicting a defendant at common law for displaying a nude painting).
52. See United States v. Thomas, 27 F. 682, 682-83 (S.D. Miss. 1886) (noting the ability of Congress to prevent the sending of obscenity through the mails); United States V.
Foote, 25 F. Cas. 1140, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1876) (No. 15,128) (same); United States v. Britton,
17 F. 731, 732 (S.D. Ohio 1883) (same); United States v. Hanover, 17 F. 444, 444 (S.D.
Ohio 1883) (same).
53. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1919) (affirming convictions
for denouncing U.S. intervention in Russia under the Espionage Act).
54. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
55. See id. at 494. The federal statute at issue in Roth provided that "[e]very obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other
publication of an indecent character ...[i]s declared to be nonmailable matter and shall
not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier." Id.
at 479 n.1.
56. See id. at 484-85.
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portance. '5 7 Therefore, the Court concluded that obscene speech should
not be granted First Amendment protection." The Court defined obscenity as that which "to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to [the] prurient interest."59
1. Possession vs. Distributionof Obscenity
The Court sharply departed from Roth in Stanley v. Georgia,6° reversing the conviction of a defendant for possession of obscene movies in
violation of a Georgia obscenity statute.6 1 Though apparently similar to
Roth, the Court distinguished Stanley because the defendant in Stanley
had been convicted of illegal possession of obscene materials within his
home, and not the sale or publication of such materials. 6 The Court declined to extend the Roth holding to include the prohibition of private
possession of obscene materials63 because such a decision would constitute governmental control of individual private thoughts and would
greatly invade their privacy rights. 4
Although Stanley seemed to partially overrule the Roth Court's exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection, the Court restricted
the breadth of that decision in United States v. Reidel.65 In Reidel, the defendant was indicted for mailing obscene material to willing and consenting adults. 66 The district court dismissed the indictment, reasoning
that the Court's ruling in Stanley had rendered the federal obscenity
statute unconstitutional.67
In reversing the district court, the Reidel Court clarified and distinguished Stanley, and upheld the constitutionality of the obscenity stat-

57. Id. at 484. As evidence, the Court noted that there was a plethora of international, federal, and state laws regulating the distribution of obscene materials. See id. at
485.
58. See id. at 485.
59. Id. at 489.
60. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
61. See id.
at 568.
62. See id. at 560-61. The Court noted that all of its previous opinions involved the
distribution, selling, or mailing of obscene material. See id.
63. See id.
at 559.
64. See id. at 565. The Court noted that "[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at
the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." Id.
65. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
66. Cf. id. at 353.
67. See id. at 353, 355 (discussing the trial court's reliance on the constitutional protections in Stanley).
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ute.68 The Court distinguished Stanley on the grounds that the decision
had focused solely on the issue of private possession of obscene materials. 6' Because the defendant in Reidel had not possessed the material
merely for private use, but had sought to distribute it using the mails, the
Court concluded that the defendant had been indicted properly for
criminal activity, not for the exercise of a protected free speech right.
2. Obscenity Defined
After Reidel, the Court faced a tumultuous period in its First Amendment obscenity jurisprudence." During this period, the Supreme Court
issued no majority opinions regarding the proper obscenity standard to
apply. At the same time, the Court reversed a multitude of obscenity
cases. 72 Recognizing that its vaguely defined obscenity standard had become unworkable, the Court reexamined its analysis of obscene speech
73
in Miller v. California.
The Miller Court propounded a three-prong test for determining
whether a work was obscene. 74 The first prong of the Miller test adopted
the Roth test and inquired "whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest."75 The Miller Court outlined the
parameters of this hypothetical community standard by overtly approving of the state community standards that the jury had used in its deliberations.7 ' The Court concluded that use of local standards adequately
would forewarn sellers and distributors of obscene materials of the standards by which their material would be judged and the activities for
68. See id. at 354-57 (refusing to read Stanley as overruling Roth, thereby validating
the obscenity statute at issue).
69. See id. The Court noted that the Stanley decision "neither overruled nor disturbed the holding in Roth." Id. at 354. Further, the Court stated that "[n]othing in Stanley questioned the validity of Roth insofar as the distribution of obscene material was concerned." Id.
70. See id. at 356 (declining to overrule the Roth principle rejecting First Amendment
protections for obscenity).
71. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 & n.3 (1973).
72. See id. (criticizing "censorship" practice of the Court due to the lack of a comprehensive obscenity law majority view).
73. See id. at 22-23. The defendant was convicted of sending unsolicited sexually explicit material through the United States mail. See id. at 16.
74. See id. at 24 (specifying basic guidelines a trier of fact must follow).
75. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
76. See id. at 31. The jury applied the community standards of California, the state in
which it was sitting. See id. The Supreme Court found that the First Amendment did not
require the formulation of a national standard to determine whether materials were obscene. See id. at 31-32.
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which they could be prosecuted."
The second prong of the Miller test asked whether the work depicted
"in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law., 78 The final prong inquired "whether the work,
taken as a whole, lack[ed] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value., 79 Thus, if the work satisfied all three of these criteria, it would be
judged as obscene and given no constitutional protection. The Miller
Court maintained that this three-pronged analysis would aid the courts in
determining whether a work was obscene and would isolate "hard core"
pornographic materials from constitutional protection.0
B. Treatments of Advancing Technologies by the Supreme Court Force
the Legal Creation of "Indecent" Speech
Although the Miller Court believed that it had resolved the "intractable obscenity issue, 8' developments in communications media once
again outpaced the developments in constitutional theory, presenting the
Court with a variety of cases involving unique First Amendment issues.
1. Broadcast Communications
In a landmark case involving broadcast radio, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,8' the Supreme Court approved a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ban on a radio broadcast that contained a variety of lewd and
suggestive words.83 In approving the ban, the Court partially extended
the Miller Court's ban on obscenity to encompass "indecent" speech by
differentiating, for the first time, between "obscene" and "indecent"
speech'
The Court separately interpreted the two federal obscenity
statutes at issue, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461 and 1464.85 The Court concluded that
77. See id. at 27.
78. Id. at 24.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 27. Such "hard core" materials, the Court noted would be "specifically
defined by the regulating state law." Id.
81. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing the three-part test set
forth in Miller).
82. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
83. See id. at 750-51. The broadcast was satirist George Carlin's famous "Filthy
Words" monologue, in which Carlin referred to several words that could not be publicly
said on the airwaves without violating FCC policy. See id. at 729.
84. See id. at 739-41.
85. See id. at 739-40. The Court cited the disjunctive use of the words "obscene" and
"indecent" in the governing federal obscenity statute and inferred congressional intent to
treat the two words differently. See id. The broadcasting statute had provided that
"[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio commu-
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§ 1461 was concerned only with obscenity, whereas § 1464 was intended
to encompass more than just obscene speech when applied to the public
broadcast medium. 6 The Court found no congressional intent to limit
the scope of § 1464 to cover only obscene material, and thus extended §
1464 to cover indecent material. The Court then vaguely defined indecent speech as speech that was contrary to "accepted standards of morality.98
Restricting the ban on indecent speech to broadcast communications,
the court made the ban dependent upon certain nuisance variables, such
as the time, place, and manner of its transmission. 89 The Court reasoned
that the ease of accessibility by minors and the unique pervasiveness of
broadcast communications justified these restrictions. 9° The Pacifica decision signaled a new direction in how the Court would conduct its constitutional inquiry-by evaluating not only the content of the speech, but
also the means through which it was communicated.9 '
Two recent cases dealing with indecent broadcasts illuminate the federal courts consistent application of the Pacifica Court's ruling in the
context of broadcast communications. In Action for Children's Televi2 (ACT II), the United States
sion v. FCCO
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted its previous adoption of the Pacifica Court's
definition of indecency and overturned an FCC order that instituted a
blanket restriction on the broadcasting of indecent programming. 93 The
nication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both." Id. at 731 n.3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)).
86. See id. at 740-41.
87. See id. at 741. The court recognized that "the First Amendment has a special
meaning in the broadcasting context." Id. at 742 n.17.
88. Id. at 740.
89. See id. at 750 (noting that the ban "rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under
which context is all-important").
90. See id. at 748-50. The Court listed several reasons why broadcast communication
deserves special First Amendment considerations, including the ease of access that children have to radios and the fact that radio receivers are usually in the home, a place where
an individual's privacy interest is entitled to extra deference. See id.
91. See id. at 750. The Court noted that constitutional restriction of any speech, especially indecency, remains "largely a function of context." Id. at 742; see also Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (ACT III) (holding that
the context of the broadcast medium must be taken into account in a First Amendment
analysis).
92. 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (ACT H), overruled in part by Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
93. See id. at 1508. The FCC order struck down in ACT 11 was a result of a congressional mandate to ban indecent television programming on a 24-hour basis. See Pub. L.
No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988). The FCC had issued a comprehensive report
finding that a 24-hour ban on indecent broadcasts comported with the Constitution. See
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court found, consistent with the Pacifica Court's holding permitting only
limited time restrictions, that a twenty-four hour restriction on the
broadcast of indecent programming was not narrowly tailored to serve
the government's interest in preventing the exposure of minors to such
material. 94
Correspondingly, the D.C. Circuit approved of an FCC regulation that
banned the broadcast of indecent programming only between the hours
of 6:00 A.M. to midnight in Action for Children's Television v. FCCO'
(ACT III). The court found that the regulation was narrowly tailored to
serve the government's compelling interest 96 in restricting the access of
minors to indecent programming. 97 Therefore, although the ACT III
court recognized that indecent speech retained constitutional protection,
it also noted that certain broadcast speech remained subject to restrictions based upon the time and method of communication. 98
Thus, the federal courts have been consistent in their application of
Pacifica that indecent broadcasts may be restricted dependent on certain
transmission variables such as time and place.
2. Regulation of Indecency in Telephonic Communications
Although the Supreme Court partially had protected indecent speech
in Pacifica, it did approve of time, place, and manner restrictions on the
broadcast of indecent speech because of the increased potential for exposure of indecent material to minors. 99 As technology progressed, the Supreme Court and the lower courts were forced to address problems,
raised by the telephonic exposure of minors to indecency, similar to
those created by broadcast communications. '°°
In Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC,0'1 a federal circuit court of apIn re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, Report of the Commission, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297, 5297 (1990).
94. See ACT IH,932 F.2d at 1509. The application of this test results from the Supreme Court's ruling in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989). See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text discussing the Sable decision.
95. 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).
96. See id. at 663, 667. The court found the age floor to be consistent with other federal and state statutes that separated those under 17 years of age for special protection.
See id. at 664.
97. See id. at 663.
98. See id. at 660.
99. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 750 & n.29 (1978).
100. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (considering issues of indecent
material on the Internet); Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
117-18 (1989) (examining dial-a-porn service problems); Carlin Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir. 1988) (same).
101. 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988).
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peals approved FCC regulations that established various defenses against
prosecution to operators of obscene or indecent telephone dial-a-porn
services. 0 2 The court noted that the defenses would restrain a minor's
ability to access dial-a-porn services, while not unduly burdening a consenting adult's constitutional right of access. 13 The three-tiered approach
promulgated by the FCC and approved by the court required payment
by credit card, the employment of access codes by the operators, and the
use of a scrambling system by the caller.""
Following Carlin, Congress once again tried to prevent children from
gaining access to dial-a-porn services by completely banning both obscene and indecent telephone messages.0 5 Following these congressional
amendments to the 1934 Communications Act, the Supreme Court in
° invalidated portions
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,'O
of § 223(b) of the Act, which completely banned indecent telephone
message services.0 7 The Court reaffirmed the principle that sexually explicit messages which are indecent, but not obscene, require First
Amendment protection. 8 The Court, however, found that a complete
ban of indecent telephone messages was not narrowly tailored to serve
the compelling government interest in protecting minors from pornographic telephone services.0 9 The Court distinguished Pacifica, which
upheld a complete ban on the broadcasting of indecent speech during
certain hours of the day, based on the medium used, explaining that minors have much easier access to radio broadcasts as compared to telephone services.""
102. See id. at 555.
103. See id. at 557.

104. See id. at 555.
105. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (Supp. V 1988) (amending the Communications Decency
Act of 1934 to promulgate penalties for transmission of indecent or obscene communication).
106. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). The case arose when Sable Communications, a provider of
sexually explicit prerecorded telephone messages, sued to enjoin the enforcement of
amended § 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934. See id. at 117-18.
107. See id. at 131.
108. See id. at 126.
109. See id. at 131. The Court concluded that the statute as written would discourage
adults from engaging in constitutionally protected speech. See id.
110. See id. at 127-28. The Court noted the affirmative steps a listener must take in
order to gain access to telephone services as further reason to treat such services differently from broadcast communication. See id. The Court remained consistent with its obscenity decisions by approving the statute's total ban on obscene messages. See id. at 124.
The Court also reaffirmed that the Miller Court's "community standard" rationale still
prevailed and that no national obscenity standard had been created by § 223(b) for obscenity. See id. at 125. The Court ruled that the mere fact that the message services op-
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Since the Sable Court rejected an outright ban on indecent messages,
Congress responded with legislation that did not constitute an outright
ban on indecent messages, but only criminalized the transmission of indecent telephone messages to anyone under eighteen years of age."' The
Ninth Circuit reviewed this legislation in Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC'12 and approved the
criminalization of the transmission of indecent messages to anyone
younger than eighteen years of age." 3 In approving the FCC's regulations on dial-a-porn services, the Ninth Circuit adhered to Supreme
Court precedent noting that indecent speech, although protected by the
First Amendment, could be restricted if the regulations
4 were narrowly
interest.
governmental
compelling
a
further
to
tailored
C. Application of FederalObscenity Standardsto Computers and the
Internet
Federal courts increasingly have addressed First Amendment obscenity and indecency jurisprudence involving computers and the Internet.
Application of previous Court rationales to the Internet has been troublesome because the Internet remains unique from other communications medium. " ' The Sixth Circuit addressed this new and evolving medium in United States v. Thomas."6 Robert and Carleen Thomas were
indicted and charged with violating federal obscenity statutes for operating a sexually explicit and obscene computer bulletin board."' The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions under federal
obscenity laws."'
erators would be subject to varying community standards did not, by itself, make the law
unconstitutional. See id. at 125.
111. See The Helms Amendment, Pub. L. No. 101-166, § 521, 103 Stat. 1159, 1192
(1989) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (Supp. 1 1989)).
112. 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
113. See id. at 879.
114. See id. at 874-76.
115. Cf. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 841-44 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing the operation and content on the Internet), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
116. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
117. See id. at 705-06. The Thomases operated a computer bulletin board which allowed members to download and print various pornographic images. See id. at 705. They
were charged with, among other counts, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1465. See id. at 706. Section
1465 prohibits the transportation in interstate commerce of "any obscene, lewd, lascivious,
or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription or other article capable of
producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character." 18 U.S.C. § 1465
(1994).
118. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 716.
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The Thomases first contended that the unique nature of computergenerated images justified their exclusion from federal obscenity statutes."' They also argued that even if the statutes governed, the standards
for judging information on such a novel medium must be updated, asserting that the national character of the Internet should force the courts
to abandon the Miller local "community standards" analysis previously
employed to evaluate obscenity.2
The court rejected these arguments and affirmed the Thomases' convictions by first determining that the federal obscenity statutes governed
information on the Internet despite the Internet's distinct technical features. ' The court then solidified its previous rationale for determining
whether information was obscene in nature and reasoned that the Miller
"community standard" test was properly applied to the Internet. The
court concluded that the Internet material was obscene, and that the
Miller test did not unconstitutionally chill free speech. 2 The court found
that providers of computer-generated obscenity could tailor their material to the collective standards of the communities they serve. 121
In response to the invention of new communications media, the Supreme Court and federal courts have, in the past thirty years, created and
applied obscenity standards to broadcast, telephonic, and Internet media.
The courts also have responded by creating and applying indecency stan-

119. See id. at 706. The Thomases argued that the federal obscenity statutes only covered tangible objects and not intangible objects like computer files. See id. (relying on
United States v. Carlin Communications, Inc., 815 F.2d 1367, 1371 (10th Cir. 1987)).
120. See id. at 711.
121. See id. at 707. The court determined that the defendants placed too much emphasis on the manner in which the Internet transmissions occurred, rather than on the actual
transmission of sexually explicit photographs from one destination to another. See id. The
defendants also argued that because the obscene material never left their home, they had
a constitutionally protected right, created by the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), to possess the material. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 710. The court disagreed,
reasoning that "Stanley 'depended not on any First Amendment right to purchase or possess obscene materials, but [rather] on the right to privacy in the home."' Id. (quoting
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126 (1973)). Further,
the court stated that the Stanley right of privacy did not "create 'a correlative right to receive [the obscene material], transport it, or distribute it' in interstate commerce." Id.
(quoting United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1973)).
122. See Thomas, 74 F.3d. at 711-12. The defendants argued that the Miller test forced
them to censor themselves and to refrain from communications so as not to violate the
standards of a given community, thus "chilling" their First Amendment rights. See id. at
711. The court rejected their argument, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,492 U.S. 121,125-26 (1989), and ruled that varying
community standards did not justify declaring the statute unconstitutional. See Thomas,
74 F.3d at 711-12.
123. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 712.
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dards to the broadcast and telephonic media. Thus, it was reasonable for
Congress in the recent CDA to apply the judicially created indecency
standards to the newest form of electronic communication: the Internet.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS REVERSING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY

ACT

The Communications Decency Act of 1996 was enacted to restrict
children's access to pornography on the Internet14 As written, the CDA
attempted to regulate both obscene and indecent speech. 25' The plaintiffs
in ACL U v. Reno, however, challenged only the indecency provisions
of the CDA, as they conceded that the government could impose a complete ban on obscene materials.127 In challenging the indecency provisions, both plaintiffs in Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno and
ACLU v. Reno attacked the vagueness of the statutory terms "indecent"
and "patently offensive," as well as the overbreadth of the statute.128
Both plaintiffs argued that the statutory definitions of "indecent" and
"patently offensive" left providers and recipients of Internet material
unaware of the actual parameters of "indecent" and "patently offensive"
speech.2 9 The plaintiffs also argued that such vague terms could lead to
arbitrary enforcement of the criminal provisions of the CDA 3 ° They further contended that the indecency provisions of the CDA were overbroad and extended beyond the reach of previous statutes by criminalizing constitutionally protected speech among adults. 3' Finally, the
plaintiffs maintained that the indecency provisions of the law restricted
material that on its face was not indecent, but rather possessed significant
132
literary and artistic value.
In overturning the indecency provisions of the CDA, the Shea and
A CL U courts focused on the overbreadth and vagueness of the statute,

124. See Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd, 117 S.Ct. 2501 (1997).
125. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (d) (West Supp. 1997) (criminalizing the display of
"patently offensive" sexually explicit material to persons under eighteen).
126. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
127. See id. at 829; cf. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 922 (challenging only the provision of the
CDA that prohibited the display of "patently offensive" material).
128. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 922; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 826-27.
129. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 935; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 850.
130. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 935; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 864.
131. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855.
132. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 853.
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A. Vagueness
The two district courts differed in resolving the plaintiffs' vagueness
challenges to the statutory terms "indecent" and "patently offensive."
The ACLU court, troubled that the statute did not define the term "indecent," found the language unconstitutionally vague. 134 The government's argument that the legislative history of the CDA contained the
appropriate definition of "indecent" failed to sway the court because the
court believed that the term should have been defined with specific reference to the Internet. 3 ' The court found the interchangeability of the
statutory words "indecent" and "patently offensive" inherently suspect
because operators of Internet sites would be unaware of the exact parameters of "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech.13 ' The ACLU
court also based its vagueness ruling on the government's inability to define the relevant community standards 37
in the CDA by which the material
was to be judged under the Miller test.1
The Shea court, however, did not find the statute unconstitutionally
vague, holding that the term "indecent," as used in the statute, merely
codified its use as represented in Pacifica."
The court reasoned that the
Pacifica Court's extensive use of the FCC's definition of "indecent" in its
opinion indicated that the Supreme Court would approve of the CDA's
codification of this same definition.' The Shea court similarly disposed
of the plaintiffs' vagueness challenge to the "patently offensive" language included in the CDA."4"
B. Overbreadth
Despite their disparate rulings on the vagueness claims, both sustained
the plaintiffs' overbreadth challenges. 4 1 Each district court first de133. See supra notes 83-92 for an analysis of the Pacificaholding.
134. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 856; id. at 858.
135. See id. at 862-63.
136. See id. at 861. The ACLU court concluded that a statute that criminalizes conduct clearly should define the outlawed conduct. See id. at 865.
137. See id. at 863-64. The ACLU court reasoned that the very nature of cyberspace
prevented any consistent application of the Miller rationale. See id.
138. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 936.
139. See id. at 935. The Shea court concluded that this approval had "foreclose[d] a
vagueness challenge to the FCC's definition for indecency in the broadcast medium." Id.
140. See id. at 936.
141. See id. at 950; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855-57.
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scribed the statute as a content-based restriction on certain speech.14
Therefore, in evaluating whether the statute was a constitutional restriction-on speech, the courts inquired, pursuant to the Sable Court's holding, whether the CDA served a compelling governmental interest and
was narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest.
1. Compelling GovernmentalInterest
The government argued, in each case, that shielding minors from access to pornographic images on the Internet was a compelling governmental interest. The ACLU court, however, discovered numerous examples of lawful and beneficial cultural and educational materials on the
Internet that would be subject to the CDA's criminal provisions.14 Both
panels questioned whether the government could have a compelling interest in restricting a minor's access to such benign material .' The two
district courts, however, did not base their opinions on the government's
a
failure to exhibit a compelling interest, because each panel assumed
6
opinions.1
their
of
purposes
for
interest
governmental
compelling
2. Narrowly Tailored Means-Safe HarborProvisions
The two district courts next determined whether the means by which
the government sought to accomplish its compelling interest were narrowly tailored. The government maintained that the CDA did not prohibit adults from engaging in their constitutionally protected rights, because the safe harbor provisions of the CDA sufficiently narrowed the
statute's reach within constitutional limits. 47 The government argued
142. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 939; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851.
143. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851. Both district courts
recognized that the level of judicial scrutiny applied depended primarily on the pervasive
nature of the specific communications medium at issue. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940;
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 872-74. The strict scrutiny standard appears to be applied to
broadcast, telephone, and Internet use. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940 (explaining that
there was little difference in the standard applied to broadcast from that of strict scrutiny
and that strict scrutiny would be used in the context of indecent Internet transmissions);
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851-52, 872-74.
144. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 853. The ACLU court cited photographs from National Geographic travel magazines, literary descriptions, paintings, and recent news stories concerning the official practice of female genital mutilation as examples of permissible
information that would be banned under the CDA. See id. The Shea court declined to
reach this issue, focusing instead on the failure of the government to constitutionally narrow the statute. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940.
145. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 853.
146. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 941; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 853.
147. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855-57. Section
223(e)(5)(A) of the CDA provided a defense to prosecution if a person "ha[d] taken, in
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that it could impose limitations on indecent speech; for as long as Internet providers abided by the safe harbor provisions, they could engage in
indecent speech without the threat of prosecution. The plaintiffs countered that the CDA prevented adults from engaging in constitutionally
protected indecent speech, and that the statutory "safe harbor" provisions would not protect Internet providers from prosecution. 9
Both district court panels concluded that the CDA was not narrowly
tailored to serve the government's interest, because the law would
impermissibly chill First Amendment rights by causing some providers to
refrain from engaging in protected speech out of fear of prosecution under the CDA.'5' The two courts determined the safe harbor provisions
were technically infeasible, and that the costs of their implementation
would be economically prohibitive for most operators.'
The panels found that for content providers, such as newsgroups and
"chat rooms," there remained no technology available that would allow
operators of these services to screen effectively for the ages of their recipients. 1 2 For content providers on the World Wide Web, however,
both panels noted that although it was technologically feasible for those
operators to discover the age of those accessing their information, such
measures would be prohibitively expensive and without guarantee that
they could screen out minors."' Therefore, both types of content providers would be forced to reduce or eliminate their operations, resulting in
54
an impermissible "chill" on their First Amendment rights.
The government also attempted to narrow the scope of the CDA by
good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication... which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications, including any method which
is feasible under available technology." 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1997). Further, § 223(e)(5)(B) provides a defense to prosecution if a person "has restricted access to
such communication[s] by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number." Id. § 223(e)(5)(B).
148. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942-43; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855-56.
149. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855-56.
150. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 943; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855-56.
151. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 943; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854. The ACLU court
noted that "[w]ith the possible exception of an e-mail to a known recipient, most content
providers cannot determine the identity and age of every user accessing their material."
Id.
152. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 945; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854. Discussing the intractability of this problem, the ACLU court noted that content providers are often unaware of
the identity of their recipients, much less of their names. See id.
153. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942-43; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
154. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 943; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854. The Shea court stated
that "to avoid the threat of CDA liability, [some Internet operators] would simply have to
refrain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech." Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 943.
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arguing that the CDA's intent was to ban only commercial purveyors of
pornography. Both panels, however, found no reference to commercial
pornography within the statute. In fact, the courts noted that Congress
did not have to pass a law prohibiting obscenity on the Internet, because
pornography was already subject to prohibition under the federal obscenity statutes1

The panels further found that the statute was not nar-

rowly tailored because small operators of Internet sites would either
have to pay for expensive, age-screening programs or cease their Internet
operations for fear of criminal prosecution."" Thus, the safe harbor provisions did not remedy the CDA's unconstitutional overbreadth 9
C. Misplaced Reliance on the Supreme Court's Holding in
FCC v. Pacifica
The ACLU court extended its ruling further than the Shea court by
analyzing the government's misplaced reliance on the Supreme Court's
ruling in Pacifica.'6 The government argued in ACLU that the Pacifica
ruling granted the government broad authority to restrict indecent
speech in any medium. The ACLU court, however, cited several recent
cases that limited the scope of the Pacifica decision. 62 The court reasoned that Pacifica's ban on indecent communications applied only to
the broadcast medium.1 63 Because the Internet more closely resembled
telephonic communications than broadcast communications,' 16 the
ACL U court concluded that a complete ban on indecent communications
would represent an unconstitutional infringement on free speech.

155. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 949; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854-55.
156. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 949; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855. The ACLU court concluded that "[ilt is clear from the face of the CDA and from its legislative history that
Congress did not intend to limit its application to commercial purveyors of pornography."

Id.
157. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 865.
158. See id. at 854-55.
159. See id. at 854-55.
160. See id. at 874-77.
161. See id. at 874.
162. See id. at 875-76. The court cited recent cases in which a complete ban on indecent communications applied only to the broadcasting medium because of broadcast's
unique pervasiveness. See id. (citing Turner Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994);
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)).
163. See id. at 876-77.
164. See id. at 851-52.
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IV. CONGRESS GETS PULLED OVER FOR RUNNING A RED LIGHT ON
THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: RENO V. A CL U

In affirming the district court's ruling in ACLU, overturning the CDA
as an unconstitutional infringement on free speech, the Supreme Court
focused its opinion on the statutory overbreadth and vagueness of the
CDA.'65 The Court characterized the government's reliance on prior
First Amendment precedent as misplaced, criticized the inherent vagueness of the CDA's statutory language, and considered the unique nature
and history of the Internet in crafting its decision.'66
In its overbreadth analysis, the Court initially focused on the government's misconstruction of prior Court precedent, finding in each instance
that the CDA was far broader than any of the constitutional statutes to
which the government had analogized the CDA1 67 The government first
relied on the Court's ruling in Ginsberg v. New York,'6 where the Court
upheld a New York statute that prohibited the selling of obscene material to minors, even though the material was not considered obscene to
adults. 69 The Court determined that the CDA was broader than the
statute in Ginsberg in three primary respects. " " First, the Court determined that the statute in Ginsberg did not bar parents from purchasing
obscene material for their children, whereas the CDA's prohibitions
would have applied despite parental consent to the activity. 7' Second,
the Ginsberg statute applied only to commercial exchanges; the CDA
contained no such limitation.'72 Third, the Ginsberg statute limited the
definition of materials harmful to minors to materials that were "'utterly
without redeeming social importance
for minors."" 73 The CDA did not
174
"indecent.'
term
define the
The government also contended that the Court's ruling in FCC v.

165. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341-50 (1997).
166. See id.
167. See id. at 2341-44.
168. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
169. See id. at 631-33.
170. See A CL U, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 646 (1968)).
174. See id. The Court noted that the CDA not only lacked a definition of the term
indecent, but more importantly, failed to include any requirement that the "patently offensive material ... lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. The
Court reasoned that some material could fall under "patently offensive" while retaining
some legitimate value, making the CDA's broad prohibition on speech containing this undefined term an integral part of the CDA's constitutional overbreadth. See id. at 2344.
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Pacifica17 saved the constitutionality of the CDA. 17 The Court disposed
of this argument by finding several differences between the CDA and the
Court-approved FCC order at issue in Pacifica.177 First, the FCC order
focused on a specific afternoon broadcast that represented a dramatic
departure from the traditional types of content normally broadcast on
that specific medium, and the order was issued by an agency charged
with regulating that particular medium. 178 In contrast, the CDA constituted a broad prohibition, irrespective of time, and was promulgated by
the Internet. 179
Congress, who was unfamiliar with the unique qualities of
Second, the FCC order was not punitive in nature, whereas the CDA
contained extensive criminal sanctions.180 Finally, the FCC order targeted a medium that had a history of extensive government regulation.'
The Court distinguished the Internet as a medium with no such history of
112
government regulation.
Finally the government analogized the CDA to the ordinance upheld
in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.'83 That ordinance, which banned
adult movie theatres from residential neighborhoods, was not directed at
the content of the movies, but instead at the secondary effects the theatres would have on the surrounding areai" The government argued that
the CDA constituted a similar type of "cyberzoning" of the Internet.'85
The Court dismissed this argument, however, stating that the CDA applied only to the content of Internet speech, and not to the time, place,
and manner of its transmission.'
The Court next focused on the statutory vagueness of the CDA. The
175. 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text (discussing
the Pacifica decision).
176. Cf ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2341-42 (responding to the government's reliance on the
analysis and holding in Pacifica).
177. See id. at 2342.
178. See id. (noting the FCC's long-standing authority to regulate radio broadcasts).
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. The Court noted that radio broadcast received the most limited First
Amendment protection because of its invasive nature, and the fact that warnings failed to
adequately protect the listener from random contact with the prohibited speech. See id.
The Court noted that the district court found the Internet lacking the same ubiquitous nature, as users must take several affirmative acts in order to access obscene or indecent material. See id.
183. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
184. See ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2342 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.

41,49 (1986)).
185.
186.

See id.
See id.
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Court initially addressed the inconsistent language in the "indecent" and
"patently offensive" provisions of the statute noting that each of these
two parts of the CDA used a "different linguistic form" in defining the
outlawed conduct and remained undefined in the CDA.'8 7 The Court
concluded that these statutory flaws would result in an unconstitutional
chill on protected speech, since speakers would refrain from engaging in
any communication that arguably would be unlawful under the CDA.m88
The Court then addressed the government's assertion that since the
CDA contained the patently offensive standard approved by the Court in
Miller, it could not be held unconstitutionally vague.
The Court reasoned that the inclusion of the patently offensive standard, by itself, did
not cure the unconstitutional vagueness of the CDA.'9 Due to the
CDA's ill-defined nature regarding key statutory language and the absence of the remaining prongs of the Miller test, the Court concluded that
"the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a
statute regulates the content of speech."' 9 Consequently, the Court
found that the CDA posed a great threat to otherwise protected
speech.' 92
Finally, the Court addressed the unique nature and history of the
Internet. First, the Court observed that the Internet had not been subject to the same extensive government regulation that had been imposed
on the broadcast industry and thus, the same extensive regulation of the
Internet could not be justified.9 Additionally, the Court noted that the
Internet is not as invasive as radio broadcast communication because an
Internet user must take several affirmative steps in order to access the

187. See id. at 2344. Specifically, the Court found that 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) outlawed
"indecent" communication, while § 223(d) prohibited material that was "patently offensive." See id.
188. See id. at 2346. The Court opined that the imprecise drafting of the statute "undermine[d] the likelihood that the CDA ha[d] been carefully tailored to the congressional
goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials." Id. at 2344.
189. See id. at 2345.
190. See id. The Court distinguished the CDA's "patently offensive" language from
the Miller test's second prong, noting the absence of the critical requirement that impermissible "material be 'specifically defined by the applicable state law."' Id. (quoting
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). The Court found that this requirement reduced the vagueness of the statutory language, by restricting the application of such an
open-ended term as "patently offensive." See id. The Court also noted that the Miller
definition is limited to "sexual conduct," whereas the CDA definition included both "excretory activities" and "organs" of a sexual nature. See id.
191. Id. at 2346.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 2343.
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Internet.9 Therefore, the same level of regulation imposed on the
Internet could not be justified. The Court also noted the district court's
finding that most sexually explicit messages that travel across the Internet are preceded by a warning, further differentiating the Internet from
the broadcast and telephonic media, where such warnings remain typically ineffective.'9 Finally, the Court determined that the Internet cannot be viewed as a scarce commodity; unlike the commercial airwaves
which have a finite number of frequencies, the Internet has infinite capacity to move and store information. 96
The concurring opinion, written by Justice O'Connor and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, focused on the CDA's attempt to create "adult
zones" on the Internet. 97 The concurring Justices all agreed that such
zones remain a constitutional mode of restricting speech, however, they
found the CDA's methods problematic. 98 The concurrence concluded
that these "adult zones" were historically constitutional only if they did
not unduly restrict an adult's access to the material and minors had no
First Amendment right to the material.' 99 The concurrence stated that
the CDA greatly restricted the adult right to receive information, and
deemed the CDA's attempt at "cyberzoning" unconstitutional2 °
V. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF RENO V. ACLU

The Supreme Court's opinion in ACLU will be remembered not only
for its immediate effect of overturning the CDA, but also for its longterm effect on statutes that attempt to regulate indecent communications. The ACLU Court clearly attempted to narrow Court precedent
which had approved of restrictions on indecent communications. 0' Perhaps the greatest ramification of the Court's decision rests with its impact
on Pacifica. The Court went to great lengths to limit the Pacifica Court's
precedent-setting approval of a restriction on indecent communication. 202
The ACLU Court emphasized that the Pacifica Court's approval of the
restriction was only a plurality decision, and then described the plurality
194. See id.
195. See id. (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), afj'd 117
S. Ct. 2329 (1997)).
196. See id. at 2344.
197. See id. at 2351-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
198. See id. at 2351.
199. See id. at 2352-53.
200. See id. at 2357.
201. See id. at 2341-43.
202. See id.
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approval as an "emphatically narrow holding. 20 3 The A CLU Court also
clarified that the Court-approved restrictions in Pacifica remained constitutional primarily due to their medium-specific application.2 1 Thus, any
future attempts to regulate indecent speech premised upon the Pacifica
holding will encounter a stricter constitutional analysis based upon the
Supreme Court's emphatic restriction of the holding in Pacifica.'5
While the majority opinion in ACLU strongly rejected the government's attempt at "cyberzoning," the concurrence suggested that, though
the CDA's attempt was unconstitutional, future attempts at "cyberzoning" would be deemed constitutional if these attempts adhered to prior
Court precedent. 1 6 This view remains untenable. The concurrence's insinuation that the Internet could be regulated through such "cyberzoning" indicates the concurrence's lack of understanding and appreciation
of the Internet's structure and culture. Though such "cyberzoning"
would be legally feasible, technically it remains impossible."
Any such attempt to "cyberzone" the Internet would require several
components, none of which apply to the Internet: a governing authority, a central technical bottleneck, and a corporate culture that lends
itself to regulation. " " A governing body could draft and impose regulations on the Internet. However, no such body presently exists."' The
Supreme Court in ACLU recognized that neither Congress nor the FCC
has had the historical relationship with the Internet to justify such a
role.' 2 Further, the imposition of such an authority should be questioned. The Internet's tremendous growth and success stemmed largely
from its freedom from government regulation and interference."3 The
prescription of such an authority today would serve only to retard the
growth of the Internet and stunt its further development.
A central bottleneck would be the obvious place to enforce such "cyberzones." This bottleneck could restrict users from access to certain in203. See id. at 2343.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 2352-53.
207. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 113.
208. See id. at 107.
209. See CADY & MCGREGOR, supra note 14, at 13-15.
210. See id. at 7-8.
211. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 107.
212. In fact the Internet's military background, which shrouded the development of
the Internet in secrecy, can be blamed for such a lack of governmental regulatory history.
See RHEINGOLD, supra note 15, at 67.
213. See id. at 84-85.
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formation and "zone" certain information to restricted areas of the
Internet. Again, no such bottleneck presently exists on the Internet.2'
The decentralized structure of the Internet prohibits such a bottleneck
21
from arising, and inhibits the enforcement of any "cyberzoning. 1
Similarly, the creation of such a technical bottleneck should be questioned. Such a bottleneck would slow the dissemination of information
on the Internet and make it more prone to attack from both technical
and non-technical influences.
Finally, a corporate culture that understands the need and justification
for regulation would greatly enable the creation and enforcement of "cyberzones." However, no such culture exists, and there appears to be no
movement toward such a culture. 21 6 The Internet's growth resulted from
a disdain of such a culture."' Those disenfranchised with government
regulation of other communications media flocked to the Internet for its
comforting independence from governmental intrusion. 8 The teaching
of such a culture likewise should be examined. The creation of a culture
accepting regulation would stifle the creative genius that initially developed the Internet and drove its expansion.2 19
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has repeatedly fashioned its First Amendment
freedom of speech jurisprudence to accommodate the unique nature of
different communications media. However, the Court also has established a series of rational and protective judicial tests for examining
statutory language attempting to restrict "indecent" and "obscene"
speech. In its Reno v. ACLU opinion the Court refused to extend this
prior treatment of pre-existing communications media to the rapidly developing world of the Internet. The Court found the CDA to be statutorily overbroad due to its inherent vagueness and its inability to govern
efficiently a medium that, historically and presently, remains free from
governmental regulation.

214. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing the
Internet as a "decentralized, global medium of communications"); affd, 117 S.Ct. 2329
(1997).
215. See id.
216. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 113.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 107.
219. Cf. id. at 113.

